

ANNEX AA
HOMELAND SECURITY

I. SITUATION AND ASSUMPTIONS

- A. Terrorism is a fact in today's world. The tactics used by terrorist to attain their goals may include bombing, arson, hijacking, ambushes, kidnapping, hostage taking, assassination and environmental destruction. The purpose of these acts is to destroy public confidence in the ability of government to protect its citizens. In order to insure large-scale dissemination of information about the act of terror the news media will be relied upon by the terrorists to spread the word of their actions.
- B. In order for terrorism to remain a viable news media event it must, over time, escalate its attacks on society using weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear and Explosives (CBRNE), or weapons combining these may be used as a WMD device to maintain this news media viability. These may be directed at buildings and population centers, or used for large-scale environmental contamination.
- C. The term "terrorism" means the following.
 - 1. A violent act or an act dangerous to human life, in violation of the criminal laws of the United States or any segment to intimidate or coerce a government, the population or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives. (US Department of Justice)
 - 2. Domestic terrorism involving groups or individuals whose terrorist activities are directed at elements of our government or population without foreign direction.
 - 3. International terrorism involving groups or individuals whose terrorist activities are foreign based and directed by countries or groups outside the United States or whose activities transcend national boundaries. (Federal Bureau of Investigation)
- D. The threat by a terrorist group or individual to use a bomb, or other device/weapon, to include persistent irritants, i.e., tear agents, oleoresin capsicum or similar agent that may or may not involve an actual weapon. All incidents will be treated as real until a search or investigation is proven otherwise.
- E. The threat or use of any tactic in furtherance of the above motives will be treated as a terrorist incident.
- F. The primary responsibility for the response management of a terrorist action that is deemed a threat to the national security rests with the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). For all other terrorist actions the primary agency will be the

Kentucky State Police (KSP). The consequence management of a terrorist event is assigned to the Federal Emergency Management Agency.

- G. Primary responsibility for an incident involving a nuclear weapon rests with the federal government and is defined in the “Federal Bureau of Investigation, Department of Defense and Department of Energy Joint Agreement for Response to Improvised Nuclear Device Incident”, Tab AA-1-1. State responsibility for the coordination of resources in any such event will be accomplished through the applicable sections of the Emergency Operations Plan (EOP).
- H. The Department for Homeland Security, Center For Disease Control (CDC) is responsible for making available medical supplies, to support local medical systems, where they are overwhelmed in a WMD incident. To provide this support CDC has in place the Strategic National Stockpile Program, Appendix M-10. Initial ability to an area can be made within twelve hours.
- I. The implementation of this plan will occur whether the result is a peaceful resolution of the crisis or a terrorist act. Both contingencies are considered in the plan.
- J. Any terrorist acts involving the intentional contamination of a waterway or supply will be responded to as other incidents except that the Environmental and Public Protection Cabinet (E&PPC) will have the primary state responsibility, in conjunction with the Health and Family Services Cabinet (H&FSC), to insure through established testing procedures that any water resource contaminated through terrorist action is controlled and safe prior to permitting consumption to resume. This will be done in accordance with the provisions in Annex CC, Water Resources, to the EOP. The actions of E&PPC will be coordinated through the Emergency Operations Center (EOC) with other responding agencies.
- K. Terrorist threats may be made by mail, phone, or they may be transmitted electronically. They may also result from intelligence gathering by law enforcement agencies. Additionally they may result from first responder information from the scene of any event. Such first responder information, whether from police, fire, EMS or other sources may be the result of response to a scene that was initially believed to be a “routine” event. As a result of this factor the notification may be delayed for a time after the event. In such cases the EOC will be activated as necessary in accordance with this Annex.
- L. Harm/Damage resulting from terrorist events can be categorized using the acronym TRACEM. TRACEM means thermal, radiation, asphyxiation, chemical, etiological and mechanical harm.
- M. All response will be coordinated using the National Incident Management System.

II. MISSION

To establish the procedures and policies that will prevent or minimize terrorist activities, apprehend the persons responsible for the incident, manage all necessary resources and to provide for the return to normal in the wake of a terrorist event.

III. DIRECTION AND CONTROL

- A. The efforts of all state agencies will be focused in support of the lead Commonwealth agency, the Kentucky State Police (KSP). All supporting agencies will report to the Incident Commander and their deployment and activities will be coordinated with the KSP commander by the KyEM Incident Commander.
- B. The Director of Kentucky Division of Emergency Management (KyEM) will coordinate the Commonwealth's organizational response. The senior KyEM officer at the scene will be designated the Incident Commander, as outlined in Annex Q, Hazardous Materials, to the EOP. The Incident Commander will provide assistance and advice to the KSP on-scene commander who will be in overall command of the situation.
- C. The Health and Family Services Cabinet will be responsible for coordinating, requesting and managing medical supplies received through the CDC – Strategic National Stockpile Program. See Appendix M-10.
- D. The Kentucky Office of Homeland Security is responsible for insuring that U.S. Department of Homeland Security threat level advisories are disseminated to all levels of government and to the citizens of the Commonwealth with information on the appropriate actions to take.
- E. In instances that involve terrorism affecting aircraft, the initial Federal response will be by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). The investigative duties will then pass to the National Transportation Safety (NTSB) upon their notification and assumption of control.
- F. Once the federal government becomes officially involved and a federal agency becomes the lead agency, all state and local agencies will act in support of the federal response. This will be done in accordance with the "U.S. Policy on Counter Terrorism, Presidential Decision Directive PDD-39", Homeland Security Presidential Directive HSPD-3 and HSPD-5, and the National Response Plan.

IV. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS

- A. Operations and missions under this plan will be carried out during given distinct time periods: Preparedness, Response, and Recovery.
 - 1. The Preparedness Phase covers normal readiness. During this period plans will be reviewed and exercised to insure their validity. The training of all

appropriate personnel will be accomplished on an annual basis.

2. The Response Phase has two identifiable periods.
 - a. The Increased Readiness Period includes readiness during the time the threat is being confirmed. Preparation to implement the plan will take precedence during the alert until advice is received from the field confirming the threat, or it is determined that the threat was false.
 - b. The Emergency Operations Period begins when a threat of the use of terrorism within Kentucky, or in a state adjacent to Kentucky is confirmed. All operations during this phase will be conducted with all possible consideration given to the time, distance and shielding construct. This is included at Tab AA-3-1. In all cases appropriate standoff distances as prescribed in the "North American Response Guidebook", a Guidance Document to Appendix AA-3 should be used.
 3. The Recovery Phase begins when it is determined that no terrorist action exists, the action is neutralized, the action is accomplished or its effects are diminishing. See Annex V – Recovery. The recovery phase will also include a measured reduction in operations and assets as dictated by the situation.
- B. All terrorist threats or activities must be reported through the local police and KSP. Local and KyEM will not be part of the law enforcement response to any terrorist incident. KyEM will act to coordinate actions in support of the police, fire, and rescue activities. The actual situation will dictate if the EOC should be opened, but the National Incident Management System will, however, always be put into effect. This will be done upon notification of either KSP or KyEM. In either event communications will begin between these agencies to provide for a coordinated response. In events where KSP, KyEM and other agencies establish on-scene command post operations they shall be placed in a common area to facilitate;
1. A coordinated response,
 2. The exchange of information and,
 3. The implementation of the Joint Information Center (JIC) for the release of information.
- C. Terrorists may resort to, or threaten, any of the acts mentioned above to achieve their goals. Since the primary objective is to destroy the public's confidence in the ability of the government to protect its citizens a coordinated response is essential to the continuation of governmental operations and the restoration of confidence. As local governments and officials are not generally equipped to deal with a major terrorist incident assistance will be needed immediately from a variety of state agencies and KyEM. If the severity of the incident warrants such action, federal agencies will be requested to support local and state officials.

This is in addition to the actions in the President's "National Response Plan" (NRP).

- D. The Kentucky Office of Homeland Security will act as the coordinator of information from the Federal Government when the National Response Plan is activated for a terrorist event.

- E. Types of NC Threats

1. Dispersal of chemical, biological or radioactive materials with no explosion involved.
2. Dispersal of chemical, biological or radioactive materials by a conventional explosive device.
3. The detonation of a nuclear device.
4. The intentional contamination of water supplies with chemical or biological agents.

- F. Response to any terrorist act involving nuclear material will be conducted in accordance with Appendix AA-1, Nuclear Terrorism Response.

- G. Antiterrorism involves the measures taken by installations, organizations or individuals to reduce the probability of their becoming a victim of terrorism. Educational programs, physical security, personal protection techniques and operational patterns are all passive means of making potential targets less appealing to terrorists.

- H. Counter Terrorism is the full range of offensive measures to prevent, deter, and respond to terrorism. Participation in counter terrorism actions is generally limited to those forces with special training and expertise.

- V. ADMINISTRATIVE SUPPORT

Support of this operation will consist of assistance from all necessary local, state and federal agencies.

- VI. GUIDANCE PUBLICATIONS

- A. U.S. Policy on Counterterrorism, Presidential Decision Directive PDD-39 and PDD-62
- B. Homeland Security Presidential Directive HSPD-3, 5, 7, 8 and 9.

- VII. APPENDIXES

- A. Appendix AA-1 Nuclear Terrorism Response
- B. Appendix AA-2 Bomb Threats
- C. Appendix AA-3 Chemical Terrorism Response
- D. Appendix AA-4 Biological Terrorism Response
- E. Appendix AA-5 Contamination of Water Supplies by Terrorists
- F. Appendix AA-6 Federal Agencies Responsibilities
- G. Appendix AA-7 THREATCON Conditions
- H. Appendix AA-8 Homeland Security Threat Levels
- I. Appendix AA-9 Maritime Security Levels
- J. Appendix AA-10 Homeland Security Presidential Directives
- K. Appendix AA-11 Kentucky WMD/HAZMAT Regional Response Teams
- L. Appendix AA-12 Fusion Center Operations

APPENDIX AA-1
NUCLEAR TERRORISM RESPONSE

I. SITUATION AND ASSUMPTIONS

- A. Primary responsibility for an incident involving an improvised nuclear weapon rests with the Federal government and is defined in Tab AA-1-1, "The Federal Bureau of Investigations, Department of Defense and Department of Energy Joint Agreement for Response to Improvised Nuclear Device Incident".
- B. Types of nuclear terrorist threats:
 - 1. Dispersal of radioactive threats.
 - 2. Detonation of a conventional bomb salted with radioactive material (Plutonium, Strontium or other known radioactive isotope).
 - 3. Detonation of an improvised nuclear explosive device.
 - 4. Detonation of a nuclear weapon.

II. MISSION

- A. To prepare a coordinated response in the event any of the above types of attack occur.
- B. To facilitate life saving, fire suppression, and rescue efforts, and the continuation of governmental operations. This will be accomplished in accordance with Annex AA, Homeland Security, and other applicable sections of the Emergency Operation Plan (EOP).

III. DIRECTION AND CONTROL

- A. All responses to nuclear terrorist event will be conducted under the command and control provisions of Annex AA, Homeland Security. The National Incident Management System will be used.
- B. Agencies described below which possess specific skills and training will provide guidance and advice to the Incident Commander in support of the overall response.

IV. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS

- A. Operations and missions under this section will be done in the Prevention Preparatory, Response and Recovery phases as in Annex AA.
- B. Under federal law the federal government assumes the responsibility of responding to any incident involving the criminal misuse of nuclear materials, to

include improvised nuclear devices, nuclear dispersal devices, or stolen nuclear weapons. This document is at Tab AA-1-1.

- C. As “first responders” local and state government agencies will be responsible for carrying out their normal emergency responsibilities as defined in their Emergency Operations Plan (EOP) until the federal government assumes the responsibility from the Governor, County Judge Executive or Mayor.
- D. Standard safety and health considerations, as outlined in Annex Q, concerning hazard materials will be followed. Downwind and hot zone determinations will be established as soon as possible. See Tab AA-3-1 on time, distance and shielding.
- E. Once Federal agents arrive on the scene and assume responsibility for finding the weapon, deactivating the weapon, or dealing with the consequences of the weapon, state and local agencies will provide support to requesting federal agencies by carrying out any protective action not in conflict with the federal response.
- F. Upon the federal government assuming responsibility the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) will establish the necessary liaison with the Department of Defense (DOD), Department of Energy (DOE), Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), Kentucky Division of Emergency Management (KyEM), Kentucky Office of Homeland Security, Health and Family Services Cabinet (H&FSC), Justice and Public Safety Cabinet, Environmental and Public Protection Cabinet (E&PPC), plus local officials as designated by the Mayor and County Judge/ Executive. **It will be the responsibility of the Kentucky Office of Homeland Security to insure the necessary liaison has been established in this situation.**
- G. Federal Agency Tasks and Responsibilities:
 - 1. The following outline of agency tasks and responsibilities is provided for guidance and should be the basis for developing supporting plans and operating procedures.
 - a. Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) – Although local government is responsible for the protection of the public health and safety from nuclear hazards, the FBI, by Federal Statute, is the lead investigative agency in all cases involving radioactive material. As the lead agency, the FBI is responsible for the investigative functions while the aspects of search and assessment of nuclear threats is delegated to the US Department of Energy (DOE), or to the state. In addition the FBI will:
 - 1) Alert FBI headquarters and all appropriate local, state and federal agencies.

- 2) Coordinate all investigative efforts with the military and civilian law enforcement agencies involved.
 - 3) Assist in the assessment of the threat.
 - 4) Coordinate news releases regarding all aspects of the threat and operations.
 - 5) Provide a location at, or near, the FBI command center for representatives of all assisting agencies to receive updates, commit resources and coordinate all activities.
 - 6) Other responsibilities outlined in Annex AA.
- b. Department of Energy (DOE) – With threats involving Special Nuclear Material (SNM) DOE will accept responsibility for control and coordination of the nuclear aspects of the operation. In addition, upon arrival, DOE will provide radiological assistance to the state and local agencies having the regularly constituted authority for the protection of the general public health and safety in accordance with Interagency Radiological Assistance Plan. Representatives of DOE, or its Nuclear Emergency Search Team (NEST) will integrate operationally with the FBI and other agencies. Duties include:
- 1) Alert state and other federal agencies as appropriate.
 - 2) Assist in the threat assessment.
 - 3) Assist in the search for, and analysis of the nuclear device in accordance with current DOE plans.
 - 4) Prepare input regarding nuclear and radiological aspects of the threat and operations for news release.
- c. Department of Defense (DOD) – Will have primary responsibility for incidents involving military weaponry and other threats as follows:
- 1) Military Weapons – In threats involving military nuclear weapons the responsible military service, or the FBI has jurisdiction. However when control of the nuclear weapon is lost into the civilian sector the FBI assumes jurisdictional responsibility for recovery and control of the weapon.
 - 2) Other threats – DOD will provide technical support when requested through the FBI. Such support will include those functions within the purview of DOD and to the extent that the principle military mission is not compromised. These functions will include, but are not limited to:

- a) Assist in providing security.
 - b) Assist in locating the device.
 - c) Assist in deactivating and removing the device.
 - d. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) - DHS will have the responsibility for coordinating the emergency planning and close out operations following resolution of the criminal aspects of the nuclear misuse. Once the device is deactivated and secured, or clean-up operations commence, DHS will assume command of the incident from the FBI. This is done as described in Annex V, Recovery, to the EOP.
- H. Pursuant to Presidential Decision Directive 39, the FBI will assume command and control of the incident management while criminal misuse activities exist. This means that all agencies will be expected to cooperate under the direction of the FBI.
- I. It is not intended that this document should supersede any DOD directive currently in effect regarding the handling of DOD special devices.
- J. Local government agencies will notify the FBI, KSP, and KyEM immediately upon receiving a nuclear weapons threat.
- K. Response.
- 1. Should a nuclear threat occur which requires meeting deadlines or making concessions during a very short time interval, the local agency receiving the threat may, by necessity, have to respond using only those skills and resources immediately available. Concessions to demands in nuclear extortion are of national interest and must be carefully evaluated. However, the nearest FBI field division, KSP and KyEM must be immediately notified of the threat. These agencies will alert additional resources and persons in order to have them available as quickly as possible.
 - 2. Some threat demands may provide time for a more deliberate, orderly and effective response. This will permit a more thorough evaluation of the threat. The following guidelines provide a basis for response action.
 - a. The Threat.
 - 1) Nuclear threats may be received by phone, mail, courier services, tape recordings, or electronic transmission. Regardless of the mode in which it is received the individual or agency receiving the threat should preserve all materials and information for investigative purposes.
 - 2) This and all information regarding the threat must be forwarded to the FBI as soon as possible, as a part of the notification process. In as

much as the exact wording and tone of a threat message can be of invaluable assistance in determining the credibility and potential hazard associated with the threat, it is imperative that the exact wording and tone be conveyed accurately.

- 3) Everything associated with the threat should be handled carefully and preserved as evidence for future examination and evaluation by experts. As few people as possible should physically touch the evidence.
- b. Notification – The FBI and KyEM should be contacted immediately upon receipt of a nuclear threat. The telephone number for the FBI is 502-583-3941. The number for KyEM is 800-255-2587 and the number for KSP is 800-222-5555.
 - c. Threat Credibility Assessment – The FBI, in conjunction with the DOE, KSP and local law enforcement agencies involved, will provide for assessment of the threat. Credibility must be continuously reviewed and assessed as investigative and search intelligence is acquired.
 - d. Coordination Between Agencies -
 - 1) The nucleus of agencies with immediate interest will be, as a minimum, the FBI, Department of Homeland Security, FEMA, DOE, DOD, SFM, KSP, KY Office of Homeland Security, KyEM, County EM, H&FSC and E&PPC. The FBI as the lead investigative agency will coordinate with all involved agencies in order to maintain continuity and cohesiveness of the actions taken. Command decisions will be made by members of this task group with regard to the discharge of their responsibilities as the situation develops. All action decisions will clear through the state EOC and the on-scene command post.
 - 2) An on-scene command post will be established where the involved agencies can meet to evaluate information, make operational decisions based on the available information and to solve the technical problems involved in the search, identification and removal of any device.
 - 3) One Joint Information Center (JIC) will be established through which all agencies will communicate with the media. Due to the potential for public panic in this type of situation no releases will be made without approval and coordination with the Incident Commander. PIO's from the several agencies will assist in the media coordination of the event.
 - e. Investigation – The investigation of a viable threat is a basic responsibility of the FBI. However the cooperation of all involved agencies is essential to the mounting of an effective investigation.

f. Search

- 1) Once it has been determined that the nuclear threat is credible and protective actions commensurate with the situation have been taken a search for the device should begin. Sophisticated search equipment will be provided by NEST. Premature searching may arouse public awareness and unwanted concern. If the response time is very short the search should be started by the responding local agency or KSP.
- 2) When the demands are to be met in a longer time period, search for a nuclear device will be conducted by NEST, as requested by the FBI, with appropriate local and state agencies assisting.
- 3) Prior to the arrival of NEST, a visual search by persons familiar with the area may be conducted. Concurrent with this search, law enforcement, in cooperation with the FBI will provide as much additional information as possible about the threat and its source.
- 4) If radiation detection equipment is used in the initial search it should be remembered that commonly available meters (including all civil defense meters) are incapable or, at best, unreliable for the detection of alpha, beta, or low energy gamma emitters.

g. Device Located

- 1) If a suspected nuclear device is found during the search prior to the arrival of NEST the area should be evacuated and other protective measures taken. DOE and H&FSC will advise the area to be evacuated. Prior to the arrival of trained Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) personnel NO ATTEMPT shall be made to neutralize, deactivate or move the device.
- 2) When a military nuclear weapon is involved a military EOD team will handle the deactivation and removal of the weapon.
- 3) If an improvised device is involved designated personnel from DOE and DOD, familiar with design characteristics of nuclear weapons or improvised devices, will determine the appropriate actions to be taken.
- 4) If a nuclear weapon is found only DOE nuclear weapons expert and/ or specially trained EOD teams will be involved.

h. Protective Action

- 1) Protective actions are nonsequential because it may be necessary to institute them at any time, or reapply them as a situation develops. They should be considered in two phases:

- a) Those actions (preventative) taken to prevent loss of life, injury, or destruction of property.
 - b) Those actions (restorative) that would be taken if the threat should be carried out.
- 2) H&FSC, Radiation Health and Toxic Agents Branch, is responsible for recommending protective actions to the Governor or the Director of KyEM, in accordance with this annex.
- i. Medical – In the event of a nuclear detonation or the dispersal of radioactive materials, special medical care may be required for irradiated and/ or contaminated patients. Most hospitals are not equipped with adequate facilities and trained personnel for required treatment; thus, cases of severe exposure should be directed to the University of Kentucky Medical Center, University of Louisville Hospital, St. Luke's Hospital in Fort Thomas, Lourdes Hospital in Paducah, or REACTS in Oak Ridge, TN.
 - 1) Local – Local government is responsible for planning and coordinating medical services during the emergency. The medical plan shall provide for:
 - a) Identification, coordination, and control of local medial emergency response forces.
 - b) Medical planning including destination, training, and exercising medical facilities and personnel.
 - c) Special medical treatment and services required for treating radiation exposed and/ or contaminated patients.
 - d) Coordination of assistance provided by hospitals, clinics, medical associations, health, and other societies and quasi-governmental groups.
 - 2) State – H&FSC is responsible for emergency medical care in support of local government and will provide:
 - a) Technical advice.
 - b) Procurement of special equipment and services, such as, whole body counters, laboratory services, decontamination facilities and the disposal of radioactive waste.
 - c) Emergency procurement, storage, distribution, and handling of supplemental medical supplies.

- d) Liaison with KyEM.
 - e) Procedures for procuring medical assistance from the other state agencies.
 - 3) Federal – Federal agencies will provide technical assistance, equipment and supplementary resources in support of medical operations.
- j. Health – After the spread of radioactive materials special health problems result from radioactive contamination. Therefore, plans for health services must address this problem as well as normal sanitation and other health concerns.
- 1) Local – Local government is responsible for providing health and sanitation services. These services include, but are not limited to:
 - a) Personnel decontamination.
 - b) Sanitation in reception centers.
 - c) Inspection of food to determine radioactive contamination.
 - d) Protection of agricultural products from contamination.
 - e) Procedures for procuring medical assistance from state agencies.
 - 2) State
 - a) KyEM will coordinate the efforts of all necessary state agencies to support local emergency operations.
 - b) H&FSC will have the responsibility for the administration and application of health service support and will provide resources, personnel and technical advice.
 - 3) Federal – Appropriate agencies can provide supplementary emergency equipment, supplies and technical support to local health authorities. Local jurisdictions should forward their requests to KyEM, which will notify DHS for assistance from appropriate agencies.
- k. Public Information
- 1) Though information of all types, from many different sources will be processed, some types are more important than others. In recognition of this fact and the necessity of using available public information facilities in the most efficient and effective manner, the following

priorities are established:

- a) Lifesaving – Information essential to survival, health, and safety before, during and after the incident.
 - b) Recovery – Information concerning disaster recovery and relief programs and services.
 - c) Other – Non-emergency information released by participating government and volunteer agencies.
- 2) Coordination of releases; In coordination with the FBI all other involved agencies will be responsible for preparing releases pertaining to their activities. All state releases will be made through the KyEM PIO. These will be prepared in accordance with the sections of the EOP which pertain to the Joint Information Center (JIC).
- I. Other State Resources
- 1) The State Fire Marshall is responsible for coordinating fire suppression, equipment, and manpower in support of local government.
 - 2) E&PPC is responsible for providing technical assistance to local governments concerning water and air quality sampling.
- m. Restoration – The problems to be solved and the work required during restoration may be complicated by the presence of radioactive contamination. Thus, local government may require state and federal support. This support, and the procedures associated with restoration is addressed in Annex V, Recovery, to the EOP.
- 1) Local – Local government is responsible for the evacuation of, and reentry to, affected areas. Tasks that may have to be undertaken during this period include:
 - a) Decontamination of property and food supplies.
 - b) Security of evacuated areas to prevent unauthorized entry and vandalism.
 - c) Mass care and welfare.
 - d) Monitoring of people and property for radiation contamination.
 - e) Transportation

- f) Identification and disposal of contaminated materials which cannot be decontaminated.
 - g) Engineer support.
 - h) Long-term radiation monitoring.
 - i) Control of radiation exposure to the public and workers.
 - j) In concert with state and federal agencies, establish a program for dealing with long-term medical problems.
- 2) State – KyEM will coordinate state support during the emergency and recovery.
 - 3) Federal – FEMA will provide assistance to state and local government upon request.

V. ADMINISTRATIVE SUPPORT

- A. Support of these operations will consist of assistance from all applicable state agencies, local government and necessary federal agencies.
- B. Resources committed to a nuclear terrorist emergency will be assigned in accordance with the principles in the Basic Emergency Operations Plan.

VI. GUIDANCE DOCUMENTS

- A. Manual of Protective Action Guides and Protective Actions for Nuclear Incidents EPA 400-R-92-0001 of October 1991.

VII. TABS

- AA-1-1 Joint Federal Agreement
- AA-1-2 Weapon Material
- AA-1-3 Radiation Exposure
- AA-1-4 Protective Actions
- AA-1-5 Search Techniques
- AA-1-6 Threat Documentation
- AA-1-7 Federal Response Scenario

TAB AA-1-1
JOINT FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY AND
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AGREEMENT FOR RESPONSE
TO IMPROVISED NUCLEAR DEVICE INCIDENTS

I. PURPOSE AND SCOPE

To set forth and define specific areas of responsibility and procedures for responding to emergencies involving improvised nuclear devices (IND) within the United States, District of Columbia, Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, and U. S. possessions and territories, by representatives of the Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI), Department of Energy (DOE), and the Department of Defense (DOD). These provisions amplify the current DOD/ DOE Agreement of 1 March 1977, DOE/ FBI Memorandum of Understanding of June 1976 dealing with response to incidents involving nuclear material, and the Attorney General's letter to the Secretary of Defense on assistance to Federal agencies combating terrorism, dated 10 November 1972.

II. TERMS OF AGREEMENT

- A. This agreement shall be effective upon signature by representatives of the FBI, DOE and DOD.
- B. Amendments, modifications or termination on this agreement may be made by written agreements of all parties.

III. POLICY

- A. In the event of a nuclear threat incident involving an IND, the FBI is responsible, as set forth in Section 221.b of the Atomic Energy Act, as amended, for investigating all alleged or suspected criminal violations of that Act.
- B. The FBI has primary jurisdiction where a question of the violation of Federal law exists and, where appropriate, will coordinate the utilization of available resources in the interest of public health and safety. DOE and DOD will provide assistance and support to the FBI as listed in Section V of this agreement.

IV. IMPLEMENTATION

Each party will issue its own departmental instructions and detailed operating procedures implementing this agreement and will develop and exchange additional instructions and procedures as are deemed necessary for the continued implementation of this agreement.

V. RESPONSIBILITIES

- A. The FBI will:

1. Act as the Federal agency in charge at the scene of and IND incident and assume jurisdiction over all field organizations.
 2. Establish and maintain contacts and coordinate IND incident support requirements with other Federal agencies and local law enforcement agencies.
 3. Provide security for personnel and equipment to be utilized in search, deactivation, and clean up operations.
 4. Provide, at the incident scene, a representative to act as liaison with Federal and local authorities.
 5. Notify appropriate individuals and offices of any nuclear threat incident.
 6. Notify DOE Headquarters of support requirements and provide:
 - a. The exact wording of threat messages, copies of drawings, nuclear material samples, or other related intelligence for scientific analysis and credibility assessment.
 - b. All information pertinent to an assessment of a threat perpetrator's technical capabilities to carry out a threat.
 7. Notify the National Military Command Center (NMCC)/ Explosive Ordinance Disposal (EOD) of support requirements for either standby or deployment.
 8. Provide additional support as required by DOE and DOD/ EOD personnel in carrying out their assigned operations.
- B. The DOE, upon notification by the FBI of an IND incident, will:
1. Provide scientific and technical assistance and advice to the FBI and DOD in the areas of threat assessment and search operations, device deactivation, hazards, assessment, containment, relocation and storage of special nuclear material evidence, and in post-incident cleanup.
 2. Analyze threat messages for technical content, nuclear design feasibility, and general credibility and provide such analysis to the FBI.
 3. Acquire, maintain, and make available any special equipment and capabilities required to provide the necessary scientific and technical support.
 4. Coordinate IND incident activities with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), as appropriate (IND incidents involving facilities or material within the jurisdiction of the NRC are initially reported by NRC to the FBI).

5. Arrange for any special transportation of DOE equipment, personnel, and/ or nuclear material, as required.
6. Notify the DOD and civilian agencies of, and request assistance for, post-incident cleanup activities as soon as appropriate.
7. Have final authority concerning the classification of Restricted Data and DOE-originated National Security Information associated with source material, special nuclear material, radioactive by-products, or nuclear weapons/ components.
8. Provide, upon request by the FBI, scientific and technical information and testimony for use in any legal action undertaken by the Department of Justice.

C. DOD, upon request by the FBI, will:

1. Provide EOD technical and operational assistance to the FBI.
2. Provide EOD technology, procedures and equipment for working point access, device deactivation, and non-nuclear device diagnostics.

D. The FBI, DOE, and DOD will:

1. Coordinate all proposed press releases related to IND incidents. Any media or public inquiries will be initially referred to the FBI; responses to such inquiries will be coordinated with DOE and DOD.
2. Treat all IND incidents with adequate security and confidentiality commensurate with National Security classification guidelines and the standards for the preservation of criminal evidence.
3. Review the IND incident for the purpose of improving upon future joint responses.
4. Provide a mechanism for coordinated planning and for coordinated training and testing of IND incident management, equipment and personnel.

E. The DOE and DOD, in support of the FBI, will:

1. Develop working point operation procedures to be followed after location of an IND.
2. Provide for:
 - a. IND EOD training material including inert nuclear and high explosive devices and fusing and firing systems.

- b. Realistic training exercises that includes participation by all parties (FBI, DOE, and DOD/ DOE).
- c. Training in EOD practices, procedures, and component identification safety precautions for IND.
- d. Research and development in the areas of render safe and disposal technology including dispersal containment concepts.

VI. PROCEDURES

A. Initial Notification

- 1. IND incidents could initially come to the attention of the FBI, DOD, or the DOE. Upon receipt of such information, the agency informed shall immediately notify the nearest FBI office and provide all known information. The FBI will officially notify all agencies involved of the incident.
- 2. All agencies shall notify the various branches, offices, or individuals concerned within their jurisdictions about the situation and specify what actions and/ or resources might be required.

B. Actions upon notification

- 1. The FBI will designate a Special Agent to take command of field operations and Special Agents to act as liaison with DOE Headquarters, local police jurisdictions, and the NMCC.
- 2. DOE will consult with the FBI and will assign personnel to provide required support. A FBI liaison representative will be designated by competent authority to accompany DOE personnel to the scene on an IND incident for local coordination purposes.
- 3. The NMCC will, upon the receipt of notification by the FBI of a credible IND incident, notify the applicable DOD Emergency Operations Center (EOC) which will utilize its established notification system in order to dispatch an EOD unit and other technical and operational support to the incident site. A FBI representative will be designated by competent authority as point of contact for EOD personnel at the scene of an IND incident for local coordination purposes.
- 4. The DOD/ DOE command post will be located in the incident site control center.

C. Threat Assessment

1. The FBI with DOE assistance, including DOD participation when appropriate, will provide a threat assessment.
2. DOE will provide scientific and technical assistance for determining the credibility of specific nuclear threats and the potential hazards associated with those threats and report its assessment to the FBI.
3. DOE will determine, in coordination with the NRC, if any source material, special nuclear material, or radioactive by-products are missing or unaccounted for and report the results to the FBI. DOD and DOE will, when requested by the FBI, determine if any nuclear weapons or components are missing.
4. The FBI will notify DOD through NMCC of any credible threat and request DOE and DOD/ DOE assistance.

D. Search and Location

1. DOE will have primary responsibility for the search and location of INDs.
2. DOE will dispatch, upon request by the FBI, a DOE response group and necessary special equipment to the scene of an incident.
3. The DOE response group will, by use of specialized equipment, attempt to determine the presence and location of an IND.
4. DOE will relay all data relating to the IND, including radiological readings, configurations, and location to the FBI and the DOD/ EOD team.
5. DOD/ EOD personnel will identify the presence or suspected presence of booby-trapped devices in the area or structure which the DOE response team is searching.
6. The DOD/ EOD team present will be responsible for the clearance of any booby-traps or other hazardous item encountered by the DOE team during the search.
7. The FBI will have primary responsibility for security of, and access to, the location of an IND incident.

E. Incident Site Reconnaissance and Clearance

1. DOD/ EOD, with Doe technical assistance, will have primary responsibility for incident site reconnaissance and clearance.
2. DOD/ EOD personnel will clear the area/ structure of explosive devices.

3. DOD will provide a qualified individual for safety and coordination of functions at the working point.

F. Diagnostics and Measurements

1. DOE, with DOD/ EOD assistance, will have primary responsibility for diagnostics and measurements.
2. DOE personnel will determine, through use of diagnostic measurement equipment, details of the suspected device, including its structure and function.

G. Dispersal Containment Preparations

1. DOD with DOE and FBI support will have primary responsibility for dispersal containment preparations.
2. DOD/ EOD and DOE personnel will develop, with FBI support, any required containment apparatus for explosive and radiological matter.

H. Device Deactivation

1. DOD/ EOD, with FBI and DOE support, will have the primary responsibility for device deactivation.
2. DOD/ EOD personnel will develop suitable render safe procedures.
3. DOD/ EOD personnel will perform the approved deactivation procedures. DOD/ EOD, FBI and DOE personnel will work in close cooperation to achieve the deactivation of the device.

I. Post-Incident Operations

1. The FBI, with support of DOE, DOD and other Federal, state and local authorities will have primary responsibility for post-incident operations.
2. DOD/ EOD and DOE personnel will work closely with, and in support of, the FBI in the preservation of evidence.
3. DOE and DOD will arrange for any special transportation of nuclear material in coordination with the FBI.
4. The FBI will request assistance from DOE, DOD and appropriate civilian agencies for post-incident cleanup.

- J. Major Emergency or Disaster – In the event of a major emergency or disaster, DOE will assist in the response to post-incident cleanup requirements in coordination with the DOD and various civilian agencies as provided for under

other agreements. DOE will have assistance from the DOD as provided for in the 1 March 1977, DOD and DOE Agreement in Response to Accidents-Incidents involving Radioactive Material or Nuclear Weapons.

VII. EMERGENCY ASSISTANCE EXPENSE

DOD, DOE and the FBI will each fund the costs which they incur in providing the equipment and services required to meet their responsibilities defined in the agreement. Any reimbursements, which may subsequently be agreed upon by the undersigned in furtherance of this agreement, will be in accordance with the Economy Act, 31 U. S. C. 8.

TAB AA-1-2
WEAPON MATERIAL

I. SITUATION AND ASSUMPTIONS

- A. A variety of materials could be used in making an improvised nuclear device. These would pose different levels of hazard to the human body.

B. Hazards

1. Plutonium (Pn)

Plutonium is a fissile nuclear material used in nuclear weapons. It is a radioactive metallic element with a very long half-life and is highly toxic and may cause death or permanent injury after internal exposure to small quantities. Entry into the body is by ingestion, inhalation, or through a break in the skin.

2. Other Radioactive Isotopes

Some of the more common radioactive isotopes other than plutonium which may be used in the threat are:

- a. P-32-phosphorus
- b. Co-60-cobalt
- c. Sr-90-strontium
- d. I-311-iodine
- e. Cs-137-cesium
- f. Ir-192-iridium
- g. Au-198-gold
- h. Ra-226-radium
- i. H-3-tritium
- j. Ca-45-calcium
- k. Zn-65-zinc

All of these and many other isotopes could be used in a dispersal device, however, there is a wide variation in toxicity among the radioisotopes depending upon their chemical and physical properties. Thus the

identification of the isotope and its chemical form is necessary to determine the proper response.

3. Fissile Materials

Only certain isotopes of uranium and plutonium (special nuclear material) are capable of sustaining a chain reaction and are suitable for use in constructing a nuclear explosive. Other elements cannot be used to make a nuclear explosive. All of the isotopes are however radioactive.

4. High Explosives (HE)

A high explosive (HE) is an essential element of a nuclear explosive. When a radioactive dispersal device is involved in the threat, HE may or may not be present. HE in the form of TNT, dynamite, and others are dangerous to handle at any time. In a bomb, they are especially dangerous since they may be used with a crude and/ or sensitive detonating device. Therefore, only an expert familiar with such devices should attempt to disarm them.

5. Nuclear Detonation

In the event of a nuclear detonation, thermal, radiation and blast are added hazards in the immediate area. In addition there is potential for airborne radiation spreading downwind and being deposited as fallout.

TAB AA-1-3
RADIATION EXPOSURE CONTROL

I. SITUATION AND ASSUMPTIONS

Procedures to be used for limiting radiation exposure have been developed by the Health and Family Services Cabinet (H&FSC), Radiation Control Branch. These procedures are contained within that branch's internal SOP.

II. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS

The following is general guidance to be observed in limiting radiological exposure if advice is unobtainable from the Radiation Health and Toxic Agent Branch of H&FSC.

A. Hazards and Exposure Criteria

Exposure to large quantities of nuclear radiation over a relatively short period of time can cause disabling sickness or death. Exposure to lesser quantities, either externally or through inhalation and ingestion, may result in chronic impairment of health. Radiation exposure may also damage the genetic material in the body of the individuals, resulting in health impairment of future generations. Therefore stringent limits have been established as follows:

1. General Population

All practicable measures must be taken to limit the whole body exposure dose to any individual of the general population to the recommended 0.1 rem in any one year.

2. Emergency Workers

When an emergency occurs, emergency operations will be necessary to save lives and reduce escalation of the radiological problem. Emergency workers who are involved could conceivably become exposed to radiation and contamination while carrying out their duties.

B. Life Saving Actions

If as a result of a release, entry into a radiation area is necessary to search for and remove injured or trapped persons, exposure limits of 5 rem may be exceeded by workers involved. In such a case, the following guidance extracted from the National Council on Radiation Protection (NCRP) Report 39 should be followed.

1. Rescue personnel should be volunteers or professional rescue personnel (e.g., firemen) who volunteer by choice of employment.

2. Rescue personnel should be broadly familiar with the consequences of exposure.
3. Women capable of reproduction should be advised of the risk before taking part in these actions.
4. Other things being equal, volunteers above the age of 45 should be selected.
5. Planned dose to the whole body shall not exceed 100 rems.
6. Hands and forearms may receive an additional dose of up to 200 rems (for a total of 300 rems).
7. Internal exposure should be minimized by the use of the best available protective clothing.
8. Normally, exposure under these conditions should be limited to once in a lifetime.
9. Persons receiving exposure as indicated above should avoid procreation for a period of several months.

C. Extraordinary Emergency Operations

This applies under less than life saving circumstances where it is still desirable to enter a hazardous area to protect facilities, eliminate further escape of effluents, or to control fires. All elements listed under the guidance given above should be followed except for the following:

1. Planned dose to the whole body should not exceed 25 rems.
2. Planned dose to the hands and forearms shall not exceed 75 rem, including the whole body component.

D. Persons receiving exposure as indicated above must be provided expert medical treatment, consultation and service of individual dosimeters.

TAB AA-1-4
PROTECTIVE ACTIONS

I. SITUATION AND ASSUMPTIONS

- A. The procedures to be used for establishing protective actions are set forth in the SOP of the Health and Family Services Cabinet (H&FSC), Radiation Health and Toxic Agents Branch and the Kentucky Department of Agriculture.
- B. These procedures will be used in response to a nuclear incident to minimize contamination.

II. MISSION

The mission for this tab is to provide protective actions to use when dealing with nuclear weapons.

III. DIRECTION AND CONTROL

Direction and Control will be provided by the local Emergency Management Director using the National Incident Management System as the foundation for all action taken.

IV. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS

- A. Two different populations at risk will have to be combined when dealing with a nuclear weapon – those at risk from direct effects, and those at risk from indirect effects.
 - 1. Direct effects include blast, fire, and initial radiation.
 - 2. Indirect effects include radioactive fallout and electromagnetic pulse.
- B. Types of Protective Action are:
 - 1. Evacuation
 - 2. In Place Shelter
 - 3. Access Control
 - 4. Agriculture Product Control (Annex BB)

The type of protective action recommended must consider time, distance and shielding.

- C. Evacuees will be moved beyond the projected 2 pound per square inch blast over pressure shock wave and/or contaminated area, whichever is greater,

resulting from the weapon explosion.

- D. Evacuees will be sheltered in conformity with local or surrounding counties' Emergency Operations Plan (s). A wide variety of protective actions are available that can be used to reduce, or eliminate the effects of radiation and contamination. For the purpose of this plan, protective actions are considered in two aspects.

1. Selected objects and material may be protected from contamination by covering them before the "cloud" arrives. For example, to avoid the contamination of food obtained from livestock, all livestock feed should be covered. Machinery that cannot be decontaminated economically should be covered. Windows and doors of homes should be closed and sealed. Livestock should be put into the best-covered space. Providing cover against contamination may require time needed for other actions, such as, evacuation. Thus, under some circumstances, it may not be feasible. Closing the intake from a contaminated reservoir to a municipal distribution system has the same effect as covering. This is a no cost action that requires little planning and does not require public participation. It requires coordination with essential water consumers (fire services) and a public information announcement.

2. Shelter from Radiation

The average home offers significant protection, especially if the ventilation system is shut off. Shelter, to be used effectively, requires professional evaluation and planning. If available, it offers an alternative to evacuation.

3. Evacuation

Evacuation is a major countermeasure to prevent or reduce exposure and contamination. It is a complex operation possibly involving several governmental departments. Detailed planning considerably enhances its effectiveness. Support evacuation will be in accordance with the Emergency Operation Plan.

4. Respirators

Most respirators with proper filtration cartridges and a good seal around the face are effective in preventing the inhalation of airborne radioactive particles. These are most applicable to emergency workers operating in the contaminated areas. Self-contained breathing apparatus are preferable. Respirators provide no protection from gamma radiation.

5. Protective Clothing

Protective clothing is worn to prevent contamination of the skin. Its principal value is to reduce or eliminate the need for skin decontamination, but offers

no protection from gamma radiation.

6. Import Clean Food and Water

The radiation and contamination levels may be low enough to meet occupancy standards, but not low enough for contaminated food and water in the area to meet ingestion standards. Such food and water should be tested in a laboratory to determine if they meet ingestion standards. Meanwhile, food and water would be imported until local supplies are determined to be safe from contamination. Uncontaminated foods such as those stored in sealed containers, refrigerators, freezers, etc., could be used.

E. Restorative Actions

Recovery and restorative actions are those necessary to allow re-entry into an area or release of items for use after having been contaminated. Some of these actions are:

1. Decontamination

Decontamination is the removal of radioactive material from surfaces. It is a corrective action to reduce the likelihood of ingestion and beta skin exposure, and to a lesser degree, whole body radiation exposure. Decontamination is a relatively expensive action that is performed under professional supervision. Allowing radioactive material to decay is an alternative to decontamination.

2. Special Chemical Treatment

Special chemical treatment is a form of decontamination applied to water, milk or other contaminated substances from which the radioactive chemicals can be removed. It is used to recover resources which would otherwise require disposal, or which would, if ingested, subject the population to internal contamination.

V. ADMINISTRATIVE SUPPORT

Administrative support will be developed locally.

TAB AA-1-5
SEARCH TECHNIQUES

I. SITUATION AND ASSUMPTIONS

- A. Upon receipt of a nuclear threat a search of the area, in advance of the federal response, may need to be conducted by local authorities.
- B. This initial search may be conducted by available personnel who are familiar with the area. These searchers must be warned to take no action in the absence of trained personnel and equipment. Time, distance, and shielding will always be a consideration.
- C. The Incident Command System will be used.

II. MISSION

To attempt to locate a device in response to a nuclear threat.

III. DIRECTION AND CONTROL

Direction and Control will be provided by the local Emergency Management Director and the Search and Rescue Coordinator.

IV. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS

A. General Considerations

- 1. The search should be conducted by, or in the presence of, trained personnel equipped with instruments capable of detecting radioactive materials.
- 2. The search can be expedited if personnel, who are familiar with the area, or the building and its contents, are used.
- 3. Area housing critical equipment/ machinery should be searched by the personnel most familiar with the area and equipment.
- 4. If a suspected nuclear or dispersal device is found:
 - a. Do NOT touch or attempt to move the object.
 - b. The danger area should be identified and blocked off with a clear zone.
 - c. Call KyEM to request technical assistance from the federal agencies responding.

- d. KyEM will notify the FBI to insure appropriate federal notifications are made.
- 5. Since plutonium is an alpha emitter, it may be carried into a building in any type of package. However, there is associated with plutonium a low energy gamma ray, which can be detected by sophisticated detection, instruments available through DOE.
- 6. The more common radiological isotopes are capable of being detected by the CDV low level Geiger counters. Nevertheless, only component, trained personnel should be involved in the search for these materials.
- 7. The Civil Defense CDV low level Geiger counter, or any other CD instrument, cannot detect alpha radiation or very low energy gamma. (Such as is associated with plutonium) therefore, it is important to remember that false/ inaccurate readings can be obtained with any instrument. For example, in high radiation the CDV low level Geiger counter may become saturated (and read zero) thereby giving a false sense of security. It is extremely important that personnel be familiar with all instrument parameters. Dangerous quantities of radioactive material can be "hidden" from detection instruments if sufficient shielding has been placed around the material to absorb the radiation.

V. ADMINISTRATIVE SUPPORT

Administrative support will be developed locally.

TAB AA-1-6
THREAT DOCUMENTATION

I. SITUATION AND ASSUMPTIONS

- A. The threat of a nuclear terrorist event may be transmitted in several forms. The threat must be carefully documented since they are useful in threat assessment and formulating the appropriate response.
- B. Threat documentation is also necessary as an evidence collection tool to assist the investigation of such threats.

II. MISSION - To provide direction for the handling of any nuclear terrorist threat received.

III. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS

- A. In the event of a written threat, or statement following an incident, the original message should be immediately turned over to a law enforcement official for preservation as evidence.
- B. When a threat, or statement, is received by phone the following information should be submitted for threat analysis. The Bomb Threat Report at page AA-2-1-2 may be used to collect the information. The following should be recorded:
 - 1. Date and time of the call.
 - 2. Exact words of the person making the call.
 - 3. Name, if given. This includes organization names and correct spelling should be requested.
 - 4. Sex.
 - 5. Accent, if any.
 - 6. Speech pattern (stuttering, lisp, slurred, etc.).
 - 7. Tone of voice (irate, calm, frightened, nervous, etc.).
 - 8. Is the voice familiar?
 - 9. Background noises.
 - 10. Local, or long distance, if known.
 - 11. If a tape has been made of the message it should be submitted as soon as possible to the KSP, or FBI, for possible voice print analysis.

C. Threats received electronically should be left intact and maintained as evidence.

TAB AA-1-7
FEDERAL RESPONSE SCENARIO

I. SITUATION AND ASSUMPTIONS

- A. Upon receipt of a nuclear terrorist threat the mechanisms in the “Joint Federal Bureau of Investigation, Department of Energy and Department of Defense Agreement for Response to Improvised Nuclear Device Incidents”, TAB AA-1-1, will be activated.
- B. State response plans should consider these actions and develop plans accordingly.

- II. MISSION - To provide a framework in which the overall plan will be developed in response to a nuclear terrorist event with consideration given to the anticipated Federal response.

III. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS

- A. Information on the threat is forwarded to the FBI.
- B. FBI contacts the Department of Energy (DOE) to evaluate the threat.
- C. If the threat is considered to be viable from a non-technical point of view the Nuclear Emergency Search Teams (NEST) at Andrews Air Force Base at Washington, DC, and McCarran Airport at Las Vegas, NV, are put on two hour alert.
- D. Technical information on the threat is forwarded by DOE to Sandia and Los Alamos National Laboratories in NM, and Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory in CA.
- E. Threat documentation is forwarded to FBI forensic laboratory for examination. Copies are sent to RAND Corporation in Santa Monica, CA, and Syracuse Research Center in Syracuse, NY, for background information on the sender.
- F. If the threat is confirmed the NEST team is dispatched to the site and a ground and aerial survey using sophisticated radiological detection gear is carried out. At this point the FBI becomes the lead agency and all actions proposed by state and local government shall be coordinated through the FBI.
- G. Once the weapons general position is located a military EOD team and NEST carry out the final search.
- H. Upon actual location of the weapon the military EOD team and NEST determine if it can be deactivated.
- I. NEST advises the Governor of the protective actions to be taken.

APPENDIX AA-2 BOMB THREATS

I. SITUATION AND ASSUMPTIONS

- A. There are two types of bomb threats:
 - 1. Hoax
 - 2. Confirmed
- B. Bomb threats are normally made by phone or mail. They may also be transmitted electronically. Rarely are they made in person.
- C. All bomb threats must be treated as real until proven otherwise.
- D. The Bomb Threat Report Form (TAB AA-2-1) will be filled out as the threat is received, or immediately afterward.
- E. Bombs may be sent by mail, delivery service, or placed on site by an individual.
- F. For purposes of this Appendix, the term bomb shall include persistent irritant devices, i.e., Tear Agents, Oleoresin Capsicum, etc.

II. MISSION

To provide the mechanism for recording and reporting bomb threats and to assist in preparing an appropriate response to them. This is particularly applicable to State offices and facilities.

III. DIRECTION AND CONTROL

- A. The building manager, or superintendent, is responsible for coordinating a search for a bomb in response to a threat.
- B. Each individual is responsible for searching his/ her area for the bomb and reporting any suspicious objects to a supervisor before evacuating.
- C. The building manager/ superintendent will order an evacuation of the building upon receipt of the threat.

IV. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS

- A. The building supervisor will be immediately notified of the bomb threat. He/ she will have the occupants of the area search their areas for any suspicious objects. Whether a bomb or suspicious object is found or not, the area will be evacuated until after the deadline for the explosion of the bomb.

- B. The local police and fire departments will be notified, but will not take part in the search. Personnel familiar with the building will conduct the search.
- C. Only when a possible bomb is located will the appropriate emergency response agencies enter the building.
- D. If a device is found the bomb threat becomes a police matter. Even if a bomb is not found the police should be notified as soon as practicable. All documentation should be made available to the police at the time of reporting.
- E. Direction and control of all activities at a bomb scene declared a terrorist event will be assumed by the local police until KSP and the FBI respond.
- F. If no bomb is found after the initial search and no explosion takes place in the indicated time period, the building will be searched again before returning to normal operations.
- G. When the building is evacuated all personnel will report to designated assembly areas. They may remain there until their normal end of shift, or the building is declared safe to enter.
- H. Maintenance personnel should be used to search all public areas in, and around, the building.
- I. The explosion of a bomb in or near a building should be treated as a fire emergency.
- J. The National Incident Management System will be used in response to a bomb threat, or explosion, when local or state government is involved.

V. TABS

AA-2-1 Bomb Threat Report

AA-2-2 Bomb Threat Procedures During Working Hours

AA-2-3 Bomb Threat During Non-working Hours

AA-2-4 Bomb Threat Procedures, Suspicious Package Found

TAB AA-2-1
BOMB THREAT REPORT

I. SITUATION AND ASSUMPTIONS

- A. When a bomb threat is received all pertinent information must be recorded to facilitate a measured response and for evidentiary purposes.
- B. Anyone receiving the threat is responsible for recording and documenting the threat.

II. MISSION

To provide a form for the purpose of recording and documenting a bomb threat.

III. DIRECTION AND CONTROL

- A. All persons receiving a bomb threat shall use the following form to record and document the contact.
- B. Supervisory personnel shall be responsible for insuring that the form is used correctly and is completed accurately.

IV. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS

The following form will be used for the purpose of recording and documenting the bomb threat immediately upon its receipt.

SEE NEXT PAGE

BOMB THREAT REPORT

INSTRUCTIONS: Remain calm, be courteous, listen, do not interrupt the caller, and notify supervisor/fellow worker immediately by prearranged signal **WHILE** the caller is on the line.

DATE: _____ **TIME CALL RECEIVED:** _____ **TIME CALL ENDED:** _____

EXACT WORDING OF PERSON MAKING THE CALL: _____

QUESTIONS TO ASK:

When is the bomb going to explode? _____

Where is the bomb now? _____

What kind of bomb is it? _____

What does it look like? _____

Why did you place the bomb? _____

TRY TO DETERMINE THE FOLLOWING: (CHECK AS APPROPRIATE)

Caller's Identity: ☐ Male ☐ Female ☐ Adult ☐ Juvenile ☐ Child (Age/years): _____

Voice: ☐ Loud ☐ Soft ☐ ^{High} Pitched ☐ Deep ☐ Raspy ☐ Pleasant ☐ Intoxicated
☐ Other (describe): _____

Accent: ☐ Local ☐ Regional (describe): _____ ☐ Foreign (country/region): _____

Speech: ☐ Fast ☐ Slow ☐ Distinct ☐ Distorted ☐ Stutter ☐ Nasal ☐ Lisp

Language: ☐ Excellent ☐ Good ☐ Fair ☐ Poor ☐ Foul

☐ Other (describe): _____

Manner: ☐ Calm ☐ Angry ☐ Rational ☐ Irrational ☐ Coherent ☐ Incoherent ☐ Deliberate

☐ Emotional ☐ Righteous ☐ Laughing ☐ Other (describe): _____

**Background
Noises:**

☐ Office Machines ☐ Traffic ☐ Factory Machines ☐ Bedlam ☐ Quiet ☐ Trains ☐ Music

☐ Animals ☐ Voices ☐ Airplanes ☐ Street ☐ Party

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION: _____

Actions to take immediately after the call: Notify Supervisory personnel as specified in written instructions.
Talk to no one except as instructed by the supervisor.

RECEIVING PHONE NUMBER _____

PERSON RECEIVING CALL _____

BOMB THREAT PROCEDURES – DURING WORKING HOURS

Courses of Action – Depending on the Circumstances

<u>BOMB THREAT</u>		<u>CONCURRENT ACTIONS</u>		<u>IF NO BOMB FOUND</u>
Action	Reaction	Emergency Team	Employee Related	
Via Telephone	Keep caller on line as long as possible and obtain as much information as possible	Activate emergency center	Warn employees of danger. Have them visually check their work spaces and lock up	Bomb threat control team searches public areas and evacuation routes more thoroughly
	Have call traced/recorded by police	Activate bomb threat control team	Restrict entry into the building	Maintenance staff conduct a detailed search of maintenance and utility areas
	Advise supervisor immediately	Advise security staff and responsible building authority	Restrict elevator use to handicapped (down only)	Have employees reexamine offices for suspicious objects
Via Note or Mail	Minimum handling of letter/note (fingerprints)	Notify police and fire departments		
		Evaluate threat	Employees evacuate	If no bomb found resume work
		Bomb threat control team searches evacuation routes		
	Advise supervisor immediately	Bomb threat control team searches common and public areas		
		Maintenance personnel search utility areas		

BOMB THREAT PROCEDURES – DURING NON-WORKING HOURS

Courses of Action – Depending on the Circumstances

<u>BOMB THREAT</u>		<u>CONCURRENT ACTIONS</u>		<u>IF NO BOMB FOUND</u>
Action	Reaction	Emergency Team	Employee Related	
Suspicious Package Found	Advise police and responsible building authority	No Emergency Team on Duty	Warn any employees of the bomb threat and have them watch for suspicious packages	Maintenance staff conduct a detailed search of:
-or-			Sound fire alarm	1. Public areas
Telephone Bomb Threat			Call Police	2. Evacuation routes
-or-			Evacuate building	3. Maintenance and utility areas
Note Threat			Restrict entry into the building	4. cursory search of office areas
			Advise responsible building authority	I police dogs, or explosive detection are available, have building searched by them
			Move maintenance employees to another building	If no detonation takes place by the next working day, request that all employees carefully search their office areas when reoccupying the building

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TAB AA-2-3
BOMB THREAT PROCEDURES – DURING NON-WORKING HOURS

BOMB THREAT PROCEDURES – SUSPICIOUS PACKAGE FOUND (ANYTIME)

Courses of Action – Depending on the Circumstances

<u>BOMB THREAT</u>		<u>CONCURRENT ACTIONS</u>	
Action	Reaction	Emergency Team	Employee Related
Suspicious Package Found	<p>Advise police and responsible building authority</p> <p>Do not touch or approach nay suspicious package</p> <p>Memorize area around package and details of package to report to explosives disposal team</p>	<p>Activate emergency control center</p> <p>Activate bomb threat control team</p> <p>Advise security staff and responsible building authority</p> <p>Warn police and fire departments</p> <p>Evaluate threat</p> <p>Bomb threat control team searches evacuation routes</p> <p>Maintenance staff search maintenance and utility areas</p>	<p>Warn any employees of danger. Have them check their areas and lock up.</p> <p>Restrict entry into the building</p> <p>Restrict elevator use to handicapped (down only)</p> <p>Evacuate employees</p>

AA-2-4-1

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BOMB THREAT PROCEDURES – SUSPICIOUS PACKAGE FOUND (ANYTIME)
TAB AA-2-4

APPENDIX AA-3 CHEMICAL TERRORISM RESPONSE

I. SITUATION AND ASSUMPTIONS

- A. The threat of a chemical based terrorist attack is a highly possible event in today's society. The ready availability of chemical compounds and agents make this form of attack more easily done. The release of chemical agents in population centers offers the terrorists a dramatic impact on society with relatively little expense and requires only a moderate level of technical expertise.
- B. Since terrorists are interested in maximizing the impact of their attacks this tactic offers a highly feasible format. This type of attack may be directed against populations which are highly concentrated, or against scattered populations when dispersed by various means including mechanical, aerosol dispersion, explosive and natural release into prevailing winds or waters.

II. MISSION

To provide for the safe, effective response to an incident of a terrorist attack that involves the use, or threatened use, of a chemical agent, or compound, as a weapon.

III. DIRECTION AND CONTROL

- A. Since the nature of chemical agents is closely associated with known chemical compounds the response to their use will be conducted with a heavy reliance on the responses described in Annex Q, Hazardous Materials, to the Emergency Operations Plan. This response will rely upon existing tactics and equipment.
- B. First responders will maintain appropriate use of the time, distance and shielding concepts as outlined in Tab AA-3-1. Whenever possible responders will use the readily available "North American Emergency Response Guidebook" in order to determine the appropriate response.
- C. The hazardous materials specialists will be relied upon by the Incident Commander to provide the expertise necessary to accomplish the mission of neutralizing or contain in the chemical compounds used in such an attack in support of the overall state response.
- D. The Weapons of Mass Destruction/Hazardous Materials Regional Response Team (WMD/HAZMAT RRT) assigned to respond to the incident will coordinate directly with the Incident Commander to determine the technical and tactical needs to respond to the attack. See Appendix AA-11.

IV. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS

- A. Upon notification that a hazardous chemical compound was intentionally released with terrorist intent the first responders on scene will make appropriate notifications to local police and fire agencies which will provide initial life-saving, public safety and fire suppression assistance.
- B. Upon notification of an incident to the Kentucky State Police (KSP), the KSP will assume the role of lead state agency. Upon notification by KSP, KyEM will activate the resources necessary to continue the operation beyond the initial response phase. All coordination will be accomplished in accordance with the provisions of Annex AA, Terrorism.
- C. Based on the location of the incident KyEM will activate the appropriate WMD/HAZMAT RRT through the KyEM Area Manager.
- D. Downwind hazard and other hot zone determinations will be established as soon as practicable. All responding personnel will adhere to the established procedures for these zones. All personnel responding to the incident will report to the established command post for deployment as outlined in Annex Q.
- E. The National Incident Management System will be used in response to a chemical attack whenever state or local government are involved.
- F. Medical and health considerations shall be considered in accordance with the construct in Appendix AA-1, Nuclear Terrorism Response.
- G. Information valuable to the response shall be gathered using the form provided at Tab AA-3-2, extracted from the "Chemical/Biological Incident Handbook".
- H. The Health and Family Services Cabinet will coordinate any requests for additional medical supplies and will manage any medical supplies delivered under the Strategic National Stockpile Program. See Appendix M-10.

V. ADMINISTRATIVE SUPPORT

- A. Support of this operation will consist of assistance from all applicable state and local agencies and federal agencies.
- B. Resources committed to chemical attack incidents will be determined and used in accordance with the principles in the Basic Emergency Operations Plan.

VI. GUIDANCE PUBLICATIONS

- A. North American Emergency Response Guidebook, 2000 edition
- B. Chemical/Biological Response Handbook, July 1995

VII. TABS

- A. AA-3-1 Time, Distance and Shielding
- B. AA-3-2 Chemical/Biological Information to be Reported

TAB AA-3-1
TIME, DISTANCE, AND SHIELDING

I. SITUATION AND ASSUMPTIONS

- A. Response to a chemical terrorism incident poses a high level of threat to personnel at all levels of government.
- B. Basic knowledge of techniques of self-protection are, therefore, essential to an effective response.

II. MISSION

To provide guidance to maximize the safety of responding personnel by providing information relative to time, distance, and shielding as protective measures.

III. DIRECTION AND CONTROL

All personnel should be provided training in these techniques from their agency. Agency personnel are to insure compliance with these guidelines.

IV. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS

- A. Time – Use time as a tool to protect yourself at the scene. Spend the shortest amount of time possible in the hazard area, or exposed to the hazard. The less time you spend in the affected area, the less likely you are to become injured. Minimizing time spent in the affected area will also reduce the chance of you contaminating a crime scene.
- B. Distance – Maximize your distance from the hazard area, or the projected hazard area. Use the recommended guidelines provided in the current “North American Emergency Response Guidebook”, or other established safety guidelines or SOPs.
- C. Shielding – Use appropriate shielding to address specific hazards. Shielding can be vehicles, buildings, chemical protective clothing and personal protective equipment. This includes fire protective clothing and self-contained breathing apparatus.
- D. Responders should use all three forms of protection whenever possible and should not spend excessive time in the hazard area only because they have protective equipment.

V. GUIDANCE DOCUMENTS

2000 Emergency Response Guidebook

TAB AA-3-2
CHEMICAL/ BIOLOGICAL INFORMATION TO BE REPORTED

I. SITUATION AND ASSUMPTIONS

- A. Appropriate response to chemical terrorist incidents require all possible information to be formulated correctly.
- B. Guidance is provided herein to insure that all possible information is gathered.

II. MISSION

To insure that persons receiving information relative to a chemical terrorist incident are able to record and document the information.

III. DIRECTION AND CONTROL

All persons having supervisory responsibility for those who may actually answer such phone threats will insure that all information possible is collected.

IV. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS

Sufficient copies of the following form will be made available for use by those who may receive the information. SEE NEXT PAGE

CHEMICAL/BIOLOGICAL INFORMATION TO BE REPORTED	
1. Caller's name and phone number:	
2. Date and time of incident:	
3. Reason for report:	
<input type="checkbox"/> Unusual Liquid Droplets	<input type="checkbox"/> People Dying
<input type="checkbox"/> People becoming Sick	<input type="checkbox"/> Unusual Odors
<input type="checkbox"/> Cloud	<input type="checkbox"/> Dead, Discolored Vegetation
<input type="checkbox"/> Dead/dying/sick Birds, Animals	<input type="checkbox"/> Other
4. Incident Location:	
Address: _____	
City: _____	
State: _____	
5. Terrain Description:	
<input type="checkbox"/> Flat	<input type="checkbox"/> Desert
<input type="checkbox"/> Sparse trees	<input type="checkbox"/> Shore
<input type="checkbox"/> Hills	<input type="checkbox"/> Urban
<input type="checkbox"/> Jungle	<input type="checkbox"/> River
<input type="checkbox"/> Mountains	<input type="checkbox"/> Suburban
<input type="checkbox"/> Forest	<input type="checkbox"/> Other
6. Weather:	
<input type="checkbox"/> Clear	<input type="checkbox"/> Rainy
<input type="checkbox"/> Snowing	<input type="checkbox"/> Dusty
<input type="checkbox"/> Cloudy	<input type="checkbox"/> Foggy
<input type="checkbox"/> Misty	<input type="checkbox"/> Other
7. Wind:	
<input type="checkbox"/> None	<input type="checkbox"/> Gusts
<input type="checkbox"/> High	<input type="checkbox"/> Mild
8. Temperature:	
<input type="checkbox"/> Hot	<input type="checkbox"/> Warm
<input type="checkbox"/> Cool	<input type="checkbox"/> Cold
Estimated Temp (F) _____	

9. Odor:
<input type="checkbox"/> None <input type="checkbox"/> Irritating <input type="checkbox"/> Garlic/horseradish <input type="checkbox"/> Changing
<input type="checkbox"/> Sweet <input type="checkbox"/> Pepper <input type="checkbox"/> Almond/Peach <input type="checkbox"/> Forest
<input type="checkbox"/> Fruity <input type="checkbox"/> Flower <input type="checkbox"/> New Mown Hay <input type="checkbox"/> Rotten Eggs
10. Visible Emission:
<input type="checkbox"/> Smoke <input type="checkbox"/> Mist <input type="checkbox"/> None
11. Unexplained Symptoms:
<input type="checkbox"/> None <input type="checkbox"/> Tightness in Chest <input type="checkbox"/> Stinging of Skin
<input type="checkbox"/> Dizziness <input type="checkbox"/> Blurred Vision <input type="checkbox"/> Reddening of Skin
<input type="checkbox"/> Fever <input type="checkbox"/> Runny Nose <input type="checkbox"/> Welts/blisters on Skin
<input type="checkbox"/> Choking <input type="checkbox"/> Coughing <input type="checkbox"/> Difficulty Breathing
<input type="checkbox"/> Nausea & Vomiting <input type="checkbox"/> Diarrhea
Other: _____
Time of onset: _____
Duration of Symptoms: _____
12. Explosion:
<input type="checkbox"/> None <input type="checkbox"/> Air <input type="checkbox"/> Ground <input type="checkbox"/> Structure <input type="checkbox"/> Underground
Describe Location: _____
Describe Device: _____
<input type="checkbox"/> Military Munitions <input type="checkbox"/> Improvised Device <input type="checkbox"/> Other <input type="checkbox"/> None
Describe Container Condition/Size: _____
13. Contact the Incident Commander and provide all information received.

APPENDIX AA-4 BIOLOGICAL TERRORISM RESPONSE

I. SITUATION AND ASSUMPTIONS

- A. The threat of a biological attack by a terrorist group poses a very real threat to society and the results can prove highly dramatic. The ability of terrorists to obtain and use a biological agent as an etiological weapon requires sophisticated scientific skills that may not be readily available. This may be overcome by the theft of biologically dangerous materials for weapons use.
- B. All threatened, or suspected biological attacks must be treated as real attacks due to the damaging nature of the agents involved. These effects must not be underestimated and the handling of these incidents must involve all possible assets.
- C. These agents may be dispersed in the same manner as chemical agents and their ability to inflict a high number of casualties in enclosed areas makes them especially viable as media events.

II. MISSION

To provide for a response to the use, or threatened use, of a biological agent as an etiological weapon as an act of terrorism and provide for the effective use of all available resources to contain the incident, reduce the casualty potential and address the effect of this type of attack.

III. DIRECTION AND CONTROL

- A. All incidents involving the use, or threatened use of biological agents will be managed in accordance with the provisions of the National Incident Management System and the Incident Commander will be responsible for coordinating the efforts of all responders in support of the lead Commonwealth agency, the Kentucky State Police (KSP) until the National Response Plan is activated.
- B. Specific direction and expertise will be required from the Health and Family Services Cabinet (H&FSC) in the initial assessment and medical services required for the response. All area hospitals and other triage facilities will be mobilized in accordance with their existing emergency plans and the identification of the agent used will be a priority task.

IV. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS

- A. Upon the report of, or the threatened use, the employment of a biological agent in a terrorist attack the KSP and Kentucky Division of Emergency Management (KyEM) will be notified and a coordination of activities will begin. The response will be based on the scale of the incident and mobilization decisions will be made

as required.

- B. All necessary assets will be mobilized to support life saving and evacuation requirements in the initial response. Upon activation of the National Response Plan (NRP) local and state assets will act in support of the lead federal agency. Their use will be determined by the NRP.
- C. The Department of Defense Bio-Chem Response Team will be activated in accordance with the procedures established by the task force under the NRP.
- D. The determination of the type of biological agent will be done as early in the incident as possible and may result from the NRP activation. This information will dictate the treatment of casualties and will be disseminated to supporting medical facilities through the command post as soon as possible.
- E. Medical and health issues shall be addressed as set out in Appendix AA-1, Nuclear Terrorism Response.
- F. Important information regarding the biological threat will be collected using the format provided at Tab AA-3-2, Information to be reported.
- G. Response should be governed by the safety principles regarding time, distance and shielding as set out in Tab AA-3-1.
- H. H&FSC will coordinate any request for additional medical supplies and will manage any medical supplies delivered under the Strategic National Stockpile Program. See Appendix M-10.

V. ADMINISTRATIVE SUPPORT

- A. Support of this operation will consist of all needed local and state agencies, in support of the Federal response.
- B. Resources committed to this response will be determined and used in accordance with the Basic Emergency Operations Plan.

APPENDIX AA-5
CONTAMINATION OF WATER SUPPLIES BY TERRORISTS

I. SITUATION AND ASSUMPTIONS

- A. The ability of terrorists to introduce toxins of any type to water supplies provides a venue for widespread impact and poses a great danger to our population. The introduction of these agents into public waters can be accomplished in a number of ways and, with minimal risk of discovery.
- B. Although the introduction of these agents in locations where they are most readily available for consumption may occur they may also be introduced in water supplies prior to their treatment. Supplies may be contaminated before, or after, treatment.

II. MISSION

To insure adequate potable drinking water for all citizens of Kentucky and to decrease the effects of the intentional contamination of the water supply.

III. DIRECTION AND CONTROL

- A. The agency owning the contaminated water supply will act as lead agency for non-law enforcement actions.
- B. The Environmental and Public Protection Cabinet (E&PPC) will provide the expertise necessary in support of the overall response to a terroristic contamination of the water supply. This expertise will be used in conjunction with the established procedures for terrorist response as outlined in Annex AA, Terrorism.
- C. The E&PPC and the Health and Family Services Cabinet (H&FSC) will jointly respond to specific terroristic contamination incidents and the response will be in accordance with Annex Q, Hazardous Materials, and Annex CC, Water Resources, of the EOP.

IV. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS

- A. The chief law enforcement agency of the jurisdiction being attacked will be the lead law enforcement agency until KSP or FBI assumes their status of lead agency.
- B. Local government may be able to provide estimates of available portable water and isolate those sources, which are contaminated.
- C. H&FSC and E&PPC will provide testing expertise to determine the contaminant and suggest decontamination procedures or exclusion periods.

- D. The Department of Military Affairs may provide additional testing and decontamination support for the operation. Water assets may also be available when provisions of Annex G to the EOP have been met.
- E. Coordination of an overall medical response to treat casualties resulting from an attack of this type will be accomplished by the H&FSC. Emergency facilities will be asked to perform in accordance with their established emergency plans.
- F. Federal response will be determined under the guidance provided in the “National Response Plan”.

V. ADMINISTRATIVE SUPPORT

- A. Support of this operation will consist of assistance from all applicable state agencies, local government and responding federal agencies.
- B. Resources committed to intentional contamination incidents will be assigned in accordance with the principles in the Basic Emergency Operations Plan.

VI. GUIDANCE DOCUMENTS

National Response Plan

APPENDIX AA-6 FEDERAL AGENCIES RESPONSIBILITIES

I. SITUATION AND ASSUMPTIONS

A. The response to a terrorist threat or incident within the U.S. will entail a highly coordinated, multi-agency local, State, and Federal response. In support of this mission, the following primary Federal agencies will provide the core Federal response:

1. Department for Homeland Security **
2. Department of Justice (DOJ) / Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) *
3. Department of Defense (DOD)
4. Department of Energy (DOE)
5. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
6. Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS)

* Lead Federal Agency (LFA) for Crisis Management

** Lead Federal Agency (LFA) for Consequence Management

B. Although not formally designated under the Homeland Security Advisory System, other Federal departments and agencies may have authorities, resources, capabilities, or expertise required to support response operations. Agencies may be requested to participate in Federal planning and response operations, and may be asked to designate staff to function as liaison officers and provide other support to the LFA.

II. MISSION

The overall LFA, in conjunction with the lead agencies for crisis and consequence management response, and State and local authorities where appropriate, will notify, activate, deploy and employ Federal resources in response to a threat or act of terrorism. Operations will be conducted in accordance with statutory authorities and applicable plans and procedures, as modified by the policy guidelines established in Presidential Decision Directive PDD-39 and PDD-62, and Homeland Security Presidential Directive HSPD-3 and HSPD-5. The overall LFA will continue operations until the crisis is resolved. Operations under the Homeland Security Advisory System will then stand down, while operations under other Federal plans may continue to assist State and local governments with recovery.

III. DIRECTION AND CONTROL

A. Department of Justice (DOJ)/
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)

1. The Attorney General is responsible for ensuring the development and implementation of policies directed at preventing terrorist attacks domestically, and will undertake the criminal prosecution of these acts of terrorism that violate U.S. law. DOJ has charged the FBI with execution of its LFA responsibilities for the management of a Federal response to terrorist threats or incidents that take place within U.S. territory. As the lead agency for crisis management, the FBI will implement a Federal crisis management response. As LFA, the FBI will designate a Federal on-scene commander to ensure appropriate coordination of the overall United States Government response with Federal, State and local authorities until such time as the Attorney General transfers the overall LFA role to DHS. The FBI, with appropriate approval, will form and coordinate the deployment of a Domestic Emergency Support Team (DEST) with other agencies, when appropriate, and seek appropriate Federal support based on the nature of the situation.

B. Department of Homeland Security (DHS)

1. As the lead agency for consequence management, DHS will manage and coordinate any Federal consequence management response in support of State and local governments in accordance with its statutory authorities. Additionally, FEMA will designate appropriate liaison and advisory personnel for the FBI's Strategic Information and Operations Center (SIOC) and deployment with the DEST, the Joint Operations Center (JOC), and the Joint Information Center (JIC).

C. Department of Defense (DOD)

1. DOD serves as a support agency to the FBI for crisis management functions, including technical operations and a support agency to FEMA for consequence management. DOD will provide assistance to the LFA and/or the CONPLAN primary agencies, as appropriate, during all aspects of a terrorist incident, including both crisis and consequence management. DOD assistance includes threat assessment; DEST participation and transportation; technical advice; operational support; tactical support; support for civil disturbances; custody, transportation and disposal of a WMD device; and other capabilities including mitigation of the consequences of a release.
2. DOD has many unique capabilities for dealing with a WMD and combating terrorism, such as the US Army Medical Research Institute for Infectious Diseases, Technical Escort Unit, and US Marine Corps Chemical Biological Incident Response Force. These and other DOD assets may be used in responding to a terrorist incident if requested by the LFA and approved by the Secretary of Defense.

D. Department of Energy (DOE)

1. DOE serves as a support agency to the FBI for technical operations and a support agency to DHS for consequence management. DOE provides scientific-technical personnel and equipment in support of the LFA during all aspects of a nuclear/radiological WMD terrorist incident. DOE assistance can support both crisis and consequence management activities with capabilities such as threat assessment, DEST deployment, LFA advisory requirements, technical advice, forecasted modeling predictions, and operational support to include direct support of tactical operations. Deployable DOE scientific technical assistance and support includes capabilities such as search operations; access operations; diagnostic and device assessment; radiological assessment and monitoring; identification of material; development of Federal protective action recommendations; provision of information on the radiological response; render safe operations; hazards assessment; containment, relocation and storage of special nuclear material evidence; post-incident clean-up; and on-site management and radiological assessment to the public. All DOE support to a Federal response will be coordinated through a Senior Energy Official.

E. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)

EPA serves as a support agency to the FBI for technical operations and a support agency to DHS for consequence management. EPA provides technical personnel and supporting equipment to the LFA during all aspects of a WMD terrorist incident. EPA assistance may include threat assessment, DEST and regional emergency response team deployment, LFA advisory requirements, technical advice and operational support for chemical, biological, and radiological releases. EPA assistance and advice includes threat assessment, consultation, agent identification, hazard detection and reduction, environmental monitoring; sample and forensic evidence collection/analysis; identification of contaminants; feasibility assessment and clean-up; and on-site safety, protection, prevention, decontamination, and restoration activities. EPA and the United States Coast Guard (USCG) share responsibilities for response to oil discharges into navigable waters and releases of hazardous substances, pollutants, and contaminants into the environment under the National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan (NCP). EPA provides the pre-designated Federal On-Scene Coordinator for inland areas and the USCG for coastal areas to coordinate containment, removal, and disposal efforts and resources during an oil, hazardous substance, or WMD incident.

F. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS)

HHS serves as a support agency to the FBI for technical operations and a support agency to DHS for consequence management. HHS provides technical personnel and supporting equipment to the LFA during all aspects of a terrorist incident. HHS can also provide regulatory follow-up when an incident involves a product regulated by the Food and Drug Administration. HHS assistance

supports threat assessment, DEST deployment, epidemiological investigation, LFA advisory requirements, and technical advice. Technical assistance to the FBI may include identification of agents, sample collection and analysis, on-site safety and protection activities, and medical management planning. Operational support to DHS may include mass immunization, mass prophylaxis, mass fatality management, pharmaceutical support operations (Strategic National Stockpile), contingency medical records, patient tracking, and patient evacuation and definitive medical care provided through the National Disaster Medical System.

IV. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS

A. The Federal response to a terrorist threat or incident provides a tailored, time-phased deployment of specialized Federal assets. The response is executed under two broad responsibilities:

1. Crisis Management

- a. Crisis management is predominantly a law enforcement function and includes measures to identify, acquire, and plan the use of resources needed to anticipate, prevent, and/or resolve a threat or act of terrorism. In a terrorist incident, a crisis management response may include traditional law enforcement missions, such as intelligence, surveillance, tactical operations, negotiations, forensics, and investigations, as well as technical support missions, such as agent identification, search, render safe procedures, transfer and disposal, and limited decontamination. In addition to the traditional law enforcement missions, crisis management also includes assurance of public health and safety.
- b. The laws of the United States assign primary authority to the Federal government to prevent and respond to acts of terrorism or potential acts of terrorism. Based on the situation, a Federal crisis management response may be supported by technical operations, and by consequence management activities, which should operate concurrently.

2. Consequence Management

- a. Consequence Management is predominantly an emergency management function and includes measures to protect public health and safety, restore essential government services, and provide emergency relief to governments, businesses, and individuals affected by the consequences of terrorism. In an actual or potential terrorist incident, a consequence management response will be managed by DHS using structures and resources of the National Response Plan (NRP). These efforts will include support missions as described in other Federal operations plans, such as predictive modeling, protective action recommendations, and mass decontamination.
- b. The laws of the United States assign primary authority to the State and local governments to respond to the consequences of terrorism; the

Federal government provides assistance, as required.

B. Lead Federal Agency Designation (LFA)

1. As mandated by the authorities referenced above, the operational response to a terrorist threat will employ a coordinated, interagency process organized through a LFA concept. PDD-39 reaffirms and elaborates on the U.S. Government's policy on counter terrorism and expands the roles, responsibilities and management structure for combating terrorism. LFA responsibility is assigned to the Department of Justice, and is delegated to the FBI, for threats or acts of terrorism that take place in the United States or in international waters that do not involve the flag vessel of a foreign country. Within this role, the FBI Federal on-scene commander (OSC) will function as the on-scene manager for the U.S. Government. All Federal agencies and departments, as needed, will support the Federal OSC. Threats or acts of terrorism that take place outside of the United States or its trust territories, or in international waters and involve the flag vessel of a foreign country are outside the scope of the Homeland Security Advisory System.
 - a. In addition, these authorities reaffirm that DHS is the lead agency for consequence management within U.S. territory. DHS retains authority and responsibility to act as the lead agency for consequence management throughout the National response. DHS will use the NRP structure to coordinate all Federal assistance to State and local governments for consequence management. To ensure that there is one overall LFA, PDD-39 directs DHS to support the Department of Justice (as delegated to the FBI) until the Attorney General transfers the LFA role to DHS. At such time, the responsibility to function as the on-scene manager for the U.S. Government transfers from the FBI Federal OSC to the Federal Coordinating Officer (FCO).

TAB AA-6-1
RESERVE FOR FUTURE USE

APPENDIX AA-7 THREATCON CONDITIONS

I. SITUATION AND ASSUMPTIONS

The Department of Defense and the National Guard Bureau has established terrorist threat conditions (THREATCON) to describe progressive levels of security measures for implementation in response to terrorist threats to be taken by the Military.

II. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS

A. There are five TREATCON levels

1. THREATCON NORMAL. Applies when there is no discernible threat of possible terrorist activity. Under these conditions, only a routine security posture, designed to defeat the criminal threat, is warranted. The minimum THREATCON is NORMAL.
2. THREATCON ALPHA. Applies when there is a general threat of possible terrorist activity against personnel and/or installations, the nature and extent of which is unpredictable, and circumstances do not justify full implementation of THREATCON BRAVO measures. Agencies will insure their personnel are aware of possible threat and conduct security procedure review.
3. THREATCON BRAVO. Applies when an increased or more predictable threat of terrorist activity exists. Security measures taken by agencies should not cause undue hardship to personnel, substantially affecting operational capabilities or aggravating relations with local authorities and members of the public seeking services.
4. THREATCON CHARLIE. Applies when an incident occurs or intelligence indicates that some form of terrorist action against personnel and/or facilities is imminent. Implementation of THREATCON CHARLIE security measures will create hardships for agency personnel and affect the activities of the agency and the public seeking services by limiting access to the facility.
5. THREATCON DELTA. Implementation in the immediate area where a terrorist attack has occurred or when intelligence indicates that terrorist action against a specific location is likely. Normally, this will result in a lock down of the facility and may include evacuation of the facility. Implementation of THREATCON DELTA normally occurs for only limited periods of time over specific, localized areas. Agencies cannot sustain THREATCON DELTA for extended periods without causing significant hardships for personnel and substantial reductions in capability to perform their normal missions.

APPENDIX AA-8 HOMELAND SECURITY THREAT LEVELS

I. SITUATION AND ASSUMPTIONS

President George W. Bush on March 12, 2002 signed Homeland Security Presidential Directive – 3, which establishes a Homeland Security Advisory System (HSAS). The system creates a national terrorist threat level warning structure to disseminate information regarding the risk of terrorist acts to Federal, State and local authorities.

II. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS

A. The Homeland Security Advisory System (HSAS) provides warnings in the form of graduated “threat conditions” that elevate along a five-tier structure as the risk of the threat increases.

B. Each of the HSAS threat conditions is identified by a threat condition and a corresponding color. The five threat conditions, their associated colors, and suggested protective measures from lowest to highest are as follows:

1. **Low Condition (Green)** – This condition is declared when there is a low risk of terrorist attacks. Federal, State, and local departments and agencies should consider the following general measures in addition to the agency-specific Protective Measures they develop and implement:
 - a. Refining and exercising as appropriate preplanned Protective Measures;
 - b. Ensuring personnel receive proper training on the Homeland Security Advisory System and specific preplanned department or agency Protective Measures; and
 - c. Institutionalizing a process to assure that all facilities and regulated sectors are regularly assessed for vulnerabilities to terrorist attacks, and all reasonable measures are taken to mitigate these vulnerabilities.
2. **Guarded Condition (Blue)** – This condition is declared when there is a general risk of terrorist attacks. In addition to the Protective Measures taken in the previous Threat Condition, Federal, State and local departments and agencies should consider the following general measures in addition to the agency-specific Protective Measures that they will develop and implement:
 - a. Checking communications with designated emergency response or command locations;
 - b. Reviewing and updating emergency response procedures; and
 - c. Providing the public with any information that would strengthen its ability to act appropriately.
3. **Elevated Condition (Yellow)** – An Elevated Condition, is declared when there is a significant risk of terrorist attacks. In addition to the Protective Measures taken in the previous Threat Conditions, Federal, State, and local

departments and agencies should consider the following general measures in addition to the Protective Measures that they will develop and implement:

- a. Increasing surveillance of critical locations;
 - b. Coordinating emergency plans as appropriate with nearby jurisdictions;
 - c. Assessing whether the precise characteristics of the threat require the further refinement of preplanned Protective Measures; and
 - d. Implementing, as appropriate, contingency and emergency response plans.
4. **High Condition (Orange)** – A High Condition is declared when there is a high risk of terrorist attacks. In addition to the Protective Measures taken in the previous Threat Conditions, Federal, State and local departments and agencies should consider the following general measures in addition to the agency-specific Protective Measures that they will develop and implement:
- a. Coordinating necessary security efforts with Federal, State, and local law enforcement agencies or any National Guard or other appropriate armed forces organizations;
 - b. Taking additional precautions at public events and possibly considering alternative venues or even cancellation;
 - c. Preparing to execute contingency procedures, such as moving to an alternate site or dispersing their workforce; and
 - d. Restricting threatened facility access to essential personnel only.
5. **Severe Condition (Red)** – A Severe Condition reflects a severe risk of terrorist attacks. Under most circumstances, the Protective Measures for a Severe Condition are not intended to be sustained for substantial periods of time. In addition to the Protective Measures in the previous Threat Conditions, Federal, State, and local departments and agencies also should consider the following general measures in addition to the agency-specific Protective Measures that they will develop and implement:
- a. Increasing or redirecting personnel to address critical emergency needs;
 - b. Assigning emergency response personnel and pre-positioning and mobilizing specially trained teams or resources;
 - c. Monitoring, redirecting, or constraining transportation systems; and
 - d. Closing public and government facilities.

C. The Homeland Security Advisory System (HSAS) color chart is contained in Tab AA-8-1.

III. TABS

A. Tab AA-8-1 Homeland Security Advisory System (HSAS) color chart

Homeland Security Advisory System

SEVERE

Severe Risk of Terrorist Attacks

HIGH

High Risk of Terrorist Attacks

ELEVATED

Significant Risk of Terrorist Attacks

GUARDED

General Risk of Terrorist Attacks

LOW

Low Risk of Terrorist Attacks

APPENDIX AA-9 MARITIME SECURITY LEVELS

I. SITUATION AND ASSUMPTIONS

The United States Coast Guard is the lead Federal Agency for Maritime Homeland Security and has implemented Area Maritime Security (AMS) plans for the three ports; Paducah, Louisville and Huntington covering the navigable rivers of Kentucky.

II. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS

A. The Maritime Security Level (MARSEC) provides warning in the form of graduated "threat conditions" that elevate along a three tier structure as the risk of threat increases.

B. The MARSEC threat conditions from lowest to highest are as follows:

1. MARSEC ONE

"Normalcy"

Minimum appropriate protective security measures must be maintained at all times. Corresponds to Homeland Security Advisory Levels Green, Blue and Yellow.

2. MARSEC TWO

"Heightened Risk"

Appropriate additional protective security measures must be maintained for a period of time as a result of heightened risk of a security incident. Corresponds to Homeland Security Advisory Level Orange.

3. MARSEC THREE

"Incident Imminent"

Further specific protective security measures must be maintained for a period of time when a security incident is probable or imminent, although it may not be possible to identify the specific target. Corresponds to Homeland Security Advisor Level Red.

APPENDIX AA-10
HOMELAND SECURITY PRESIDENTIAL DIRECTIVES

HSPD 1	Organization and Operation of the Homeland Security Council, 29 Oct. 01
HSPD 2	Combating Terrorism Through Immigration Policies, 29 Oct. 01
HSPD 3	Homeland Security Advisory System, 11 Mar. 02
HSPD 4	National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction, 11 Dec. 02
HSPD 5	Management of Domestic Incidents-National Response Plan, 28 Feb. 03
HSPD 6	Integration and Use of Screening Information, 16 Sep. 03
HSPD 7	Critical Infrastructure Identification, Prioritization, and Protection, 17 Dec. 03
HSPD 8	National Preparedness, 17 Dec. 03
HSPD 9	Defense of United States Agriculture and Food, 30 Jan. 04
HSPD 10	Biodefense for the 21 st Century, 28 April 04
HSPD 11	Comprehensive Terrorist-Related Screening Procedures, 27 Aug. 04
HSPD 12	Policy for a Common Identification Standard for Federal Employees and Contractors, 27 Aug. 04
HSPD 13	Maritime Security Policy, 21 Dec. 04

To view complete text of each HSPD go to: <http://www.whitehouse.gov>

APPENDIX AA-11
KENTUCKY WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION/HAZARDOUS MATERIALS
REGIONAL RESPONSE TEAMS

I. SITUATION AND ASSUMPTIONS

- A. The potential for major HAZMAT events as well as Weapons of Mass Destruction Chemical (WMD) events within the borders of the Commonwealth is high enough to warrant the development of an all hazards approach in the planning for an emergency response.
- B. The Commonwealth of Kentucky will not receive sufficient funds from Federal Grant programs or State programs for equipment and training to develop the WMD/HAZMAT response needs of each County and Local Community and therefore has decided to concentrate the majority of its funding efforts on the strategy of developing regional WMD/HAZMAT response teams.
- C. WMD/HAZMAT Regional Response Teams will be developed within the boundaries of the 14 existing KyEM Emergency Management Areas to meet the first 72 hours of response needs for State, County and Local communities.

II. MISSION

The Commonwealth of Kentucky will be able to detect, mitigate, prepare for, respond to and recover from a WMD or major HAZMAT incident uniformly across the state commensurate with risk and maintain initial response operations over a 72 hour period.

III. DIRECTION AND CONTROL

- A. Prior to deployment the WMD/HAZMAT Regional Response Teams are under the administrative control of a regional board of directors formed under direction of the Team's By-Laws and are affiliated with local Emergency Management Programs by MOU with KyEM.
- B. Upon deployment to an incident scene, the WMD/HAZMAT Regional Response Teams will be under the direct control of the Incident Commander at the scene and will operate in accordance with the National Incident Management System.

IV. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS

- A. Upon notification that a WMD or major HAZMAT event has occurred the first responders on scene will make appropriate notifications to local police and fire agencies which will provide initial life-saving, public safety and fire suppression assistance.
- B. Upon notification of a WMD or major HAZMAT incident to the State Emergency Operations Center (SEOC) the SEOC will activate the WMD/HAZMAT Regional

Response Team associated with the Emergency Management Area that the event is occurring in.

- C. Downwind hazard and other hot zone determinations will be established as soon as practicable. All responding personnel will adhere to the established procedures for these zones. All personnel responding to the incident will report to the established command post for deployment as outlined in Annex Q.
- D. The National Incident Management System will be used in response to either a WMD attack or major HAZMAT event whenever state or local government are involved.
- E. Medical and health considerations shall be considered in accordance with the construct in Appendix AA-1, Nuclear Terrorism Response.
- F. Information valuable to the response shall be gathered using the form provided at Appendix AA-3, Tab AA-3-2, extracted from the "Chemical/Biological Incident Handbook".
- G. The Health and Family Services Cabinet will coordinate any requests for additional medical supplies and will manage any medical supplies delivered under the Strategic National Stockpile Program. See Appendix M-10.

V. ADMINISTRATIVE SUPPORT

- A. Support of this operation will consist of assistance from all applicable state and local agencies and federal agencies.
- B. Resources committed to chemical attack incidents will be determined and used in accordance with the principles in the Basic Emergency Operations Plan.

VI. GUIDANCE PUBLICATIONS

- A. North American Emergency Response Guidebook, 2000 edition
- B. Chemical/Biological Response Handbook, July 1995
- C. WMD/HAZMAT Regional Response Team Standard Operating Guidelines (1-14)
- D. WMD/HAZMAT Regional Response Team By-Laws (1-14)
- E. WMD/HAZMAT Regional Response Team MOU (1-14)

APPENDIX AA-12
FUSION CENTER OPERATIONS

I. SITUATION AND ASSUMPTIONS

TO BE DEVELOPED